Abstract: Can phenomenologists allow for the existence of unobservable entities such as atoms, electrons, and quarks? Can we justifiably believe in the existence of entities that are in principle unobservable? This paper addresses the relationship between Husserlian transcendental phenomenology and scientific realism. More precisely, the focus is on the question of whether there are basic epistemological principles phenomenologists are committed to that have anti-realist consequences with respect to unobservable entities. This question is relevant since Husserl's basic epistemological principles, such as the "principle of all principles," seem to suggest that epistemic justification is limited to what can be originally given in the sense that if an object cannot be given in an originary presentive intuition, then one cannot be justified in believing that this object exists. It is the main aim of this paper to show (i) that interpretative reasons exist for not reading Husserl in such a way and (ii) that systematic reasons exist as to why phenomenologists should not subscribe to this criterion. I shall put forward a different criterion of justification that satisfies the spirit of Husserlian transcendental phenomenology and allows for justifiably believing in the existence of unobservable scientific entities.
Towards a phenomenological transcendental idealism
Husserl's last major work, The Crisis of European Sciences and Transcendental Phenomenology, not only offers a new way to the transcendental reduction by taking the ontology of the life-world as the starting point, but also outlines the cornerstones of a phenomenological approach towards a philosophy of science. In this paper, I explore how phenomenological transcendental idealism (TI), as established in Husserl's Crisis, relates to scientific realism. More precisely, the question is whether phenomenological TI is compatible with affirming the existence of unobservable entities, which are taken for granted in currently established natural sciences. Examples of such unobservable entities include atoms, electrons, and quarks.1 In this section, we will see that a Husserlian phenomenological TI has an intrinsic epistemological2 component: via his conception of the correlational a priori, Husserl closely connects TI with a theory of evidence.
Husserl's Crisis might be best known for its criticism of what the European sciences have become, but there is little agreement and much confusion about what precisely is being criticized by Husserl. Does he criticize the natural sciences per se or only how they are philosophically interpreted? With respect to formalisation and mathematization: Does he criticize that natural sciences use formalisations or how these formalisations and their significance are philosophically interpreted?3 Thus, I begin with an overview of what Husserl explicitly criticizes:
(1) The demand that the kind of reasoning/formalisation that is so successful in the positive sciences must be the role model for all kinds of reasoning, i.e., for all kinds of scientific research, is "nonsense" (Hua VI, 317). (2) Modern formalised science is incapable of providing answers to humanity's "most burning" questions (Hua VI, 4). (3) In modern science there has taken place a "surreptitious substitution of the mathematically substructed world of idealities for the only real world," namely, "our everyday life-world" (Husserl 1970, 48 f.) , not realizing that the lifeworld is the "constant fundament" of all positive sciences (Hua VI, 342).
Which means that (4) the world of our everyday experiences, our life-world4, has been reduced to mere illusion, (5) formulas are not interpreted as a method to describe nature but as true nature itself.
Moreover, (6) Science has lost its true sense, has become a mere technique, and all attempts to lead the scientist to a sense-revealing reflection are disregarded as metaphysics (Hua VI, 57) .
Each of these points deserves its own discussion, but since we are interested in the relationship between transcendental phenomenology and scientific realism, we need to focus on (5). What Husserl wants to point out is that mathematics and geometry are only methods used to describe physical reality; they are not the "true" reality lying behind what we can intuitively (anschaulich) observe. He criticizes that scientists and philosophers seem to have forgotten this point and tend to confuse what is a method with what is reality. To be sure, Husserl does not criticize science or the formalisations that take place in scientific investigations per se. He criticizes how the scientists' methods are ontologically interpreted. As Rosemary Lerner puts it:
The 'crisis of European sciences and humanity' is due not to the 'application' of analytic geometry to the physical world but to the 'shift in meaning' whereby it is concealed and forgotten that mathematical disciplines are only powerful 'methods' and ingenious 'hypotheses' constructed by finite human beings, not ontological descriptions regarding a supposed reality 'such as God sees it in itself'. (Lerner 2015, 168) Husserl holds that transcendental phenomenology must clarify the foundations of the natural sciences, and Lerner is right when she says that precisely " [t] hese issues led Husserl in 1898 to the 'universal apriori of correlation' (Husserl 1970b: §46) , and thus to the version of intentionality he developed in his transcendental phenomenology." (Lerner 2015, 165) The life-world is the meaning-foundation for all positive sciences and transcendental phenomenology must investigate and clarify the basic role the life-world plays. To be sure, transcendental phenomenology cannot deliver the basic axioms, principles, or laws that occur in the "exact" sciences, but it can and must clarify why axioms, principles, or laws of a specific type are appropriate for the corresponding science. Transcendental phenomenology can do this, because it is the only science that goes beyond the life-world. It does so by adopting the transcendental attitude in which we are not directed towards the objects that occur in our everyday lives but towards the way in which these objects appear (cf. Hua VI, 155, 161 f.). By investigating how different types of objects can be given to us, i.e., investigating the correlation between consciousness and world, transcendental phenomenology has realized that the ultimate foundation of knowledge and science is not the life-world but subjectivity (cf. Hua VI, 70, 115) . All objective knowledge is founded on subjectivity.
All knowledge is knowledge of an agent, and in explaining how knowledge is possible, one ultimately has to turn away from objective states of affairs and instead focus on the subject's consciousness. The ultimate evidence for my knowing that there is a table in front of me is not the existence of the table but my  experiencing this table. My experiencing this table gets its justificatory force not from the reliability of my  sensory apparatus but from the distinctive, originally presentive phenomenal character of this experience  ( cf. Hua XXIV, 347) . What ultimate evidence is cannot be investigated objectively but only subjectively by turning to one's experiences and to how these experiences can be described from a first-person perspective.
As transcendental phenomenology precisely is the science which investigates the structures of consciousness and experience from a first-person perspective, transcendental phenomenology is the ultimate science. Not because it can deliver the axioms, principles, laws, or theorems of every or even any individual science, but because it investigates how the objects of the respective sciences can be given and what type of evidence is appropriate for each type of object and, in further consequence, for each science.
According to my understanding of transcendental phenomenology, Husserl's correlational a priori is the key to understanding this doctrine. For Husserl, it is vital that the "[c]ategory of objectivity and category of evidence are perfect correlates," (Husserl 1969, 161) or, as Heffernan puts it, that "evidence is a function of the evident." (Heffernan 1998, 26) This means that the type of object I experience determines the type of evidence that is available to me (e.g., inadequate evidence for physical objects, apodictic evidence for mathematical truths, and adequate evidence for my existence). In his Crisis Husserl calls this doctrine the "universal a priori of correlation between experienced object and manners of givenness," and he has left no doubt that the significance of this doctrine can hardly be overestimated as he states that his "life-work has been dominated by the task of systematically elaborating on this a priori of correlation." (Husserl 1970, 166, note) This means that at the bottom of Husserl's TI there is the epistemological thesis of the correlational a priori, telling us that the type of object determines the type of evidence, i.e., the type of justification that is possible for this object. Accordingly, we need to answer the following question: What kind of justification -if any -is possible for unobservable entities? In addition, we shall clarify what the basic epistemological principle looks like that governs the possibility of justification. What is the criterion of justification, i.e., which conditions need to be fulfilled so that justification is possible?
We have seen that Husserl considers formalisation and mathematisation in science to be tools or methods. They can be used to describe reality, they can be used to make predictions about reality, but they must not be confused with what reality is. Tables and chairs are real. I can use physical formulas to predict what happens when a chair drops from a table. These formulas might describe or capture reality, they are useful, but they are not part of what reality is.
Is the same true for unobservable entities such as atoms, electrons, and quarks? Are they only useful concepts to describe and predict the features and behavior of tables and chairs or are they real themselves? There are passages in Husserl's oeuvre that suggest an anti-realist reading.5 I consider this to be the most forcible one: "[The physical sciences] aim at law-like formulae with the purpose of orientation in the world of appearances, and their existential claims have the value of mere auxiliary tools [Hilfsmittel] for precisely this purpose." (Hua XXII, 168; translation borrowed from Wiltsche 2012, 106) Such passages notwithstanding, commentators have tended to interpret Husserl as a proponent of scientific realism, even if often in a novel sense.6 Recently, Wiltsche (2012) challenged such interpretations and opted for a clearly anti-realist reading of Husserl's philosophy of science.7 According to Wiltsche, there is a systematic epistemological reason why Husserl must be an anti-realist with respect to unobservable entities. This is the claim that according to Husserl we can only gain justification for what can be given to us originarily.
It is the main aim of this contribution to show (i) that there are interpretative reasons for not reading Husserl in such a way and (ii) that there are systematic reasons why phenomenologists should not subscribe to this criterion. I shall put forward a different criterion of justification that satisfies the spirit of Husserlian transcendental phenomenology and allows for justifiably believing in the existence of unobservable scientific entities.
Originality and Justification
As mentioned above, Wiltsche holds that Husserl's basic epistemological theses lead to a version of scientific anti-realism that "is not ontological, but epistemological in nature." (Wiltsche 2012, 112 ) This means we must adopt "an agnostic stance with regard to existential claims about unobservable entities such as 'atoms, ions, and the like'." (Wiltsche 2012, 112) According to this reading, Husserl does not deny that unobservable scientific entities exist, but insists that we can never justifiably believe in their existence. Hence, we pose the following question: Which basic epistemological principle is it that forbids justification with respect to unobservable entities? I shall call this principle the Originality Thesis of Justification.
Originality Thesis of Justification (OTJ): Epistemic justification is limited to what can be originally given in the sense that if X8 cannot be given in an originary presentive intuition, then one cannot be justified in believing that X exists or obtains.
Accordingly, believing that p can only be justified if p can be originally given in an originary presentive intuition.9 Originary presentive intuitions are intentional acts in which the object/content is presented as "bodily present," is given in a "fleshed out" manner. These acts are contrasted with empty, signitive acts in which what is given to us is not the object in its actual presence but the object as something that is meant only (cf. especially Husserl's Sixth Logical Investigation). The prime example of originary presentive acts are perceptual acts in which we are perceptually aware of the object in question.10 OTJ allows that justification for statements like "There is a book on the table" is possible since it is possible to have a visual experience of a book on the table. Seeing a book on your table means having an originary presentive intuition of a book on your table. Three clarifications are in order. First, Husserl uses the term of originary intuition in a very broad sense that encompasses not only perceptual experiences but also logical, mathematical, and epistemic intuitions such as "~(p ˄ ~p)," "2 is the only even prime number," and "Originary presentive intuitions are a source of justification."11 Secondly, OTJ states only that "justification is limited to what can be originally given." This means that it is only required that it must be possible that your belief's content is or becomes given originally. It is not required that the content actually is originally given.12 This means OTJ is not incompatible with justification through inferential reasoning, testimony, and memory. For instance, if a trustworthy person tells you that your office door is open, you might be justified in believing this even if you are not visually aware of your office door. Of course, you can go and check. This means it is in principle possible that the content of your belief "my office door is open" can be originally given.
Thirdly, according to my reading, hallucinations and illusions can also be originary intuitions.13 This is important because if you have a perfect hallucination of a table in front of you, you are plausibly justified in believing that there is a table. OTJ would be in trouble explaining this if hallucinations did not bear the mark of originary givenness.
8 Here X is an object or a state of affairs. 9 This is the most straightforward way to express that what is given matches what is believed. I do not wish, however, to suggest that experiences are conceptual nor that Husserl thinks so. I shall remain neutral on this issue. 10 For more details on Husserl's conception of originary presentive intuition cf. Berghofer 2017a, section 2.1. 11 I would like to point out that Husserl's conception of value-ception ("Wertnehmung," cf. Hua XXXVII) suggests that also moral perceptions and ethical intuitions should count as originary intuitions. For the details and significance of a phenomenological intuitionism cf. Rinofner-Kreidl 2015. 12 Note that this is also how Wiltsche would define a phenomenological criterion of justification: Only possible but not actual originary givenness is required. 13 For the claim that hallucinations also are originary intuitions cf. Erhard 2012, 57 , who confirms this by referring to Hua XVI, 15.
We shall see that there are many crucial passages in Husserl's oeuvre that seem to suggest OTJ. However, I argue (i) that Husserl on some occasions argues that OTJ is wrong, (ii) that phenomenologists are not forced to subscribe to OTJ, and further (iii) that phenomenologists should not subscribe to OTJ.
What textual evidence is there that Husserl subscribes to OTJ? For Wiltsche, one of the key passages is Husserl's principle of all principles. Husserl formulates his basic principle as follows:
No conceivable theory can make us err with respect to the principle of principles: that every originary presentive intuition is a legitimizing source of cognition, that everything originarily (so to speak, in its 'personal' actuality) offered to us in 'intuition' is to be accepted simply as what it is presented as being, but also only within the limits in which it is presented there. (Husserl 1982, 44) Wiltsche is clearly right when he says:
It is nearly impossible to overestimate the importance of this passage for phenomenological philosophy. For with the introduction of the 'principle of principles', Husserl commits phenomenology to a method of intuition and thus fortifies the well-known slogan 'Back to the things themselves!' (Wiltsche 2012, 108) What exactly does the principle of all principles tell us? There are at least two claims we need to elaborate on:
C1: Every originary presentive intuition is a source of epistemic justification.
Unfortunately, Husserl often fails to explicitly distinguish between immediate (= non-iferential) and inferential justification, but in light of the context in which the principle of all principles is placed and the examples Husserl gives to clarify the justificatory force of originary givenness (cf. Hua XXIV, § 51), it is clear that originary presentive intuitions exhibit the crucial feature of providing immediate justification. Thus, we can specify: C1*: Every originary presentive intuition is a source of immediate justification.
The second claim concerns the limits Husserl discusses.
C2: What is originarily presented to you in intuition is to be accepted "only within the limits in which it is presented there."
It is obvious that C2 is of crucial importance to Husserl; it is less clear, however, what it precisely means. Let us discuss three possible answers:
A1: Intuitive justification is prima facie justification: What is originally given is immediately justified but not (necessarily) infallibly. Your acceptance of what is originally given to you is prima facie in nature. You need to be aware that further experiences (or further information in a broad sense) might defeat the justification provided by your current experience.
Connecting C2 with A1 makes sense, since shortly before the introduction of the principle of all principles, Husserl stresses that the fact that originary presentive intuitions are not only a source of justification but the ultimate source of justification:
does not exclude the possibility that, under some circumstances, one seeing conflicts with another and likewise that one legitimate assertion conflicts with another.
[…] It does say, however, that perhaps in a certain category of intuitions (and that is the case precisely with sensuously experiencing intuitions) seeing is, according to its essence, 'imperfect,' that of essential necessity it can become strengthened or weakened, that consequently an assertion having an immediate, and therefore genuine, legitimizing ground in experience nevertheless may have to be abandoned in the further course of experience because of a counter legitimacy outweighing and annulling it. (Husserl 1982, 36 f.) A2: The correlational a priori: Every originary presentive intuition provides immediate prima facie justification, but what originary givenness means depends on the type of object that is given. Originary givenness of ordinary objects such as tables and chairs, for instance, differs from the originary givenness of mathematical truths in that, with respect to the former, only inadequate but not apodictic evidence is possible. Evidence is inadequate if the object in question is given inadequately, i.e., in adumbrations. The appropriate type of evidence for the latter is apodictic evidence. When you have apodictic evidence of p, you "see" why p is necessarily true. Connecting C2 with A2 makes sense due to the significance Husserl attributes to the correlational a priori. A3: Originary givenness vs. co-givenness: In perception, one must differentiate between what is originally given and what is co-given. The object of your perception is always the whole object but, strictly speaking, what you can, for instance, visually perceive is only the front side of a physical object. Only the front side is originally given to you. Concerning the justificatory status of your beliefs, you must be careful when you go beyond what is originally given.
It is important to point out that Husserl subscribes to all these claims (A1-A3). All are important aspects of his phenomenological epistemology and it might well be that by talking about "limits" he had each of these aspects in mind. In my opinion, however, the wording of his principle of all principles suggests that he primarily wanted to point towards A3.14 Also, it is A3 that is of primary importance for our present investigation. Notice that my formulation of A3 is rather vague. The demand to be "careful" in going beyond what is originally given could range from "you are never justified in believing what is not originally given" to "in some cases you are not justified in believing what only is co-given." Clarifying in which way what is originally given is epistemically distinguished from what only is co-given is of central epistemological importance and crucial for our specific question of whether we are justified in believing that there are unobservable entities. Let us introduce some possible interpretations of A3: The difference between I1 and I2 is the restriction to immediate justification in I2, which means that I1 is considerably stronger than I2. When I have an originary presentive intuition of a table, and what is originally given to me is only the top of the table, then, according to I1, this perceptual experience cannot have justificatory force with respect to the proposition "This object has four legs." I2 only forbids that my originary intuition can immediately justify believing this proposition but allows for inferential justification based on this intuition.
The difference between I3 (= Strong OTJ) and I4 is, again, that I4 implies a restriction to immediate justification. Notice that Strong OTJ is a really strong claim, considerably stronger than OTJ. According to Strong OTJ, when you know that your friend is a reliable person, and she tells you that your office door is open, you are not justified in believing this until you see it (or have another originary presentive intuition of the open door like by touching it). OTJ does not tell whether you are justified in believing that the door is open, but at least it does not exclude justification by testimony. We have seen that subscribing to OTJ would make Husserl an anti-realist with respect to unobservable entities. Since Strong OTJ is considerably stronger, subscribing to Strong OTJ would also make him an anti-realist.
The difference between I1 and I3 on the one hand and I2 and I4 on the other hand is that I1 and I2 are only concerned with justification delivered by originary presentive intuitions. Thus, if the four legs of the table in front of you are not originally but only co-given, I3 forbids that you can justifiably believe that it has 14 We will realize the plausibility of this interpretation when we pay attention to Husserl's formulations of the "first methodological principle" in his Cartesian Meditations and the "most general principle of justification" in First Philosophy II. 15 In the sense that if X is not originally given to subject S, then S cannot be justified in believing that X exists or obtains. Note that this claim is considerably stronger than OTJ in that I3 limits epistemic justification to what is actually originally given, which is why I call I3 Strong OTJ. four legs, but I1 does not. I1 only forbids that your justification is provided by an originary intuition. Since I1 leaves open whether there are other sources of justification, strictly speaking, it does not forbid justification for beliefs whose contents are not originally given. Since Husserl holds that all justification ultimately rests on originary presentive intuitions (cf. Hua III/1, 43), this distinction might vanish or become blurred.
It is important to note that only Strong OTJ and OTJ would make Husserl an anti-realist. By discussing Husserl's "first methodological principle," established in his Cartesian Meditations, and his "most general principle of justification," stated in Husserliana VIII, we will see that textual evidence indeed exists that Husserl subscribes to Strong OTJ. Subsequently, however, we shall discuss a passage in Husserliana XXIV that clearly shows that Husserl denies Strong OTJ and that he does so for good reasons.
Husserl formulates his first methodological principle thus:
By this preliminary work, here roughly indicated rather than done explicitly, we have gained a measure of clarity sufficient to let us fix, for our whole further procedure, a first methodological principle. It is plain that I, as someone beginning philosophically, since I am striving toward the presumptive end, genuine science, must neither make nor go on accepting any judgment as scientific that I have not derived from evidence, from 'experiences' in which the affairs and affair-complexes in question are present to me as 'they themselves'. (Husserl 1960, 13) Here, Husserl basically tells us: Accept nothing that is not originally given (= Strong OTJ). Similarly, in Husserliana VIII he introduces a "most general principle of justification" according to which we have to "obey the principle of pure evidence," which means:
We shall not accept anything as being ultimately cognized, thus accept nothing as being or being in a specific way or being in a specific mode of being, that does not itself stand as being in a specific way or being in its specific mode of being before our eyes, that is grasped in precisely the way it has been meant and posited in our epistemic belief. (Hua VIII, 32) This passage, again, is an acknowledgment of Strong OTJ. Can there be any doubt that Husserl subscribes to Strong OTJ and, accordingly, to scientific anti-realism? It ought to be pointed out that, in the contexts of his "first methodological principle" and his "most general principle of justification," he says we should follow these principles as "beginning philosophers." Thus, these principles might be considered methodological devices that are supposed to make sure that the scientist who is interested in ultimate grounding (i.e., the phenomenologist) begins with the clearest and most fundamental insights available to her. According to this reading, this does not imply that in your daily life you are not justified in believing what your reliable friends tell you or that the natural scientists are not justified in believing in the existence of unobservable entities. In addition, we should reject Strong OTJ for systematic reasons as it is implausible and has highly counter-intuitive consequences. Strong OTJ prohibits justification by testimony, memory, and induction, as well as justification for everything that is co-given. To my knowledge, the passage in which Husserl is most explicitly aware of the shortcomings of Strong OTJ appears in Husserliana XXIV. This passage begins by acknowledging Strong OTJ:
Originary, unbroken belief justifies simply because it is originary, namely as a quality of authentic consciousness of givenness and of that being fulfilled within its limits. Within these limits, just as long as the circle of experience is not expanded, the fulfilment is definitive and consequently confers justification. To be kept in mind in this regard, though, is that perception justifies only so far as it actually is perception, only so far as the authentic perceptual appearance is concerned, therefore, not in terms of the qualities belonging to the back not perceived authentically.16 (Hua XXIV, 346) Just like the aforementioned principles, this passage, so far, strongly speaks in favor of interpreting Husserl as subscribing to Strong OTJ. It is even more explicit since here he denies that perceptual experiences provide justification for what is merely co-given. However, directly following this passage there is a note in which Husserl says: "That is not correct [my emphasis]. The manner of justification may be different and more incomplete, but the object's existence is also posited with information about its back [my emphasis].
Otherwise, how could I justifiably say the thing is there? Therefore, differences of completeness." (Husserl 2008, 342 , fn 36) Here, Husserl explicitly denies Strong OTJ in that he states that we can have justification for what is merely co-given. While "the manner of justification may be different," the point is, there can be justification. The question, of course, is: In which manner do they differ? What is the difference between justifiably believing what is originally given and justifiably believing what is motivated by being co-given? One possibility is to account for this difference in terms of degrees of justification. P1: The difference is a matter of degrees of justification. What is originally given is always justified to a higher degree than what is co-given.
However, it seems to me that the difference should be of a more fundamental or essential manner.
P2:
The difference is a matter of epistemic immediacy. What is originally given is immediately justified; what is co-given can only be inferentially justified.
It is important to distinguish between psychological/phenomenal immediacy and epistemic immediacy. When you see the traffic lights turn green, your belief that you are now allowed to set off might be psychologically immediate (you do not consciously make any inference), but epistemically this belief depends on your background knowledge of traffic rules. Seeing a green light provides immediate justification for believing that there is a green light. Your belief that now you are allowed to set off is something that goes beyond what is originally given and depends for its justification on your knowledge of traffic rules. As you do not consciously make an inference, this belief is psychologically immediate but not epistemically. Having refuted Strong OTJ for both systematic and interpretative17 reasons, we now turn to the much more tenable OTJ.
Limits of originary givenness and a new criterion of justification
Again, OTJ is the claim Originality Thesis of Justification (OTJ): Epistemic justification is limited to what can be originally given in the sense that if X cannot be given in an originary presentive intuition, then one cannot be justified in believing that X exists or obtains.
Wiltsche characterizes this position as follows: "This is to say that if we accept judgments without actual insight and thus without intuition, we do so on the presupposition that the intuitive givenness of the intended thing or state of affairs is a possibility that could be realized at least in principle." (Wiltsche 2012, 109) My aim in this section is to demonstrate that Husserl contravenes this principle on important occasions. This implies that even if Husserl subscribes to OTJ, he cannot consistently do so. To put it differently, there are Husserlian doctrines that are incompatible with OTJ. The Husserlian doctrine I shall focus on in this section is the following one:
HD: Empathy is a source of epistemic justification.
Husserl undeniably subscribes to HD. Importantly, what is justified by empathy are contents that cannot 17 By interpretative reasons, I refer to the footnote in Husserl 2008, 342, which we have just discussed. An anonymous referee of this journal has argued that my rejection of Strong OTJ is justified "for the reasonableness of the conclusion" but that I have not really offered interpretative reasons for doing so. However, in the quoted footnote Husserl literally says that it "is not correct" to restrict justification to what is originally given since we can also have justification for what is only co-given. By looking at the book in front of me, I am justified in believing that the book has a back side even if this back side is not originally given to me. I would agree with the referee that I am interpreting Husserl strongly in the sense that while there are many passages in Husserl's oeuvre that seem to suggest Strong OTJ (we have discussed some of them in this section), I have focused on the plausible passage in which he explicitly criticizes Strong OTJ. However, in what follows I will present systematic and interpretative reasons for rejecting even the weaker OTJ.
be originally given.18 It is to be noted that Husserl himself holds that such contents cannot be originally given. An example of such content is the sadness of the person in front of me. The reason why I focus on HD is not only that Husserl's analysis of empathy reveals that he cannot consistently advocate OTJ. More importantly, he also provides an explanation of how it is possible that beliefs about others' mental states can be justified despite the fact that other minds cannot be originally given. We shall see that in this context Husserl sketches how OTJ could be replaced by a more promising criterion of justification.
When I see somebody squatting in a corner and crying, it is safe to say that this person feels miserable. As Husserl points out on numerous occasions, the co-givenness of other minds is significantly different from the co-givenness of the book's back side. With respect to the latter, it is in principle always possible to make the object of your intention originally given. All I need to do is to turn the book. The case of the givenness of other minds is fundamentally different in that it is per se impossible to make other minds originally given. As Husserl puts it, experiencing other minds is always an act of appresentation for which it is characteristic that it can never be turned into an act of presentation. Husserl calls this appresentation an analogizing appresentation as it is fundamentally rooted in the originary givenness of one's own consciousness. In this sense, one might say that the experience of other minds is a "secondary form of perception" (Hua VIII, 63 f.). Sometimes he even says that the other's consciousness is given in a "tertiary originality" as we must take into account not only the originary givenness of one's own consciousness but also "everything that belongs to memory" (Hua XV, 641 f.).
The following passage gives us a pretty good idea of Husserl's conception of perceptually co-intending other minds:
[N]either the other Ego himself, nor his subjective processes or his appearances themselves, nor anything else belonging to his own essence, becomes given in our experience originally. [...] A certain mediacy of intentionality must be present here [...] We have here, accordingly, a kind of making 'co-present', a kind of 'appresentation'. An appresentation occurs even in external experience, since the strictly seen front of a physical thing always and necessarily appresents a rear aspect and prescribes for it a more or less determinate content. On the other hand, experiencing someone else cannot be a matter of just this kind of appresentation, which already plays a role in the constitution of primordial Nature: Appresentation of this sort involves the possibility of verification by a corresponding fulfilling presentation (the back becomes the front); whereas, in the case of that appresentation which would lead over into the other original sphere, such verification must be excluded a priori. How can appresentation of another original sphere, and thereby the sense 'someone else', be motivated in my original sphere and, in fact, motivated as experience as the word 'appresentation' (making intended as co-present) already indicates? Not every non-originary making-present can do that. A non-originary making-present can do it only in combination with an originary presentation, an itself-giving proper; and only as demanded by the originary presentation can it have the character of appresentation somewhat as, in the case of experiencing a physical thing, what is there perceptually motivates <belief in> something else being there too. (Husserl 1960, 109 f.) This passage is highly relevant. Not only does it show that for Husserl beliefs about the existence and contents of others' mental states can be justified even though other minds cannot be originally given, which entails that he cannot consistently subscribe to OTJ, but this passage also gives some hints on how OTJ can be replaced by a new criterion of justification. Thus, in this section I do not only want to show that Husserl must reject OTJ, but also that he puts forward (at least the sketch of) a more promising criterion.
18 In the next section, I briefly discuss that Husserl's claim that induction is a source of epistemic justification also contravenes OTJ. Arguably, memory should be added to empathy and induction. When I remember that yesterday I felt unhappy, I am justified in believing so, but my mental state from yesterday cannot be given to me originarily. Memory, however, is a tricky subject. Since Husserl's conception of empathy and the obvious success of induction suffice to make my point, I will not discuss memory.
We may summarize the theses of this passage as follows: 1. The other's mental state cannot be given originally (cf. also Hua III/1, 328; Hua VIII, 187-189). 2. Empathy (experiencing other minds) involves "a certain mediacy of intentionality." 3. The other's mental state can only be co-given, i.e, only be given in an appresentation. 4. Appresentation and co-givenness also occur in perceiving physical things, since what is given in perception always outstrips what is originally given, which means that there always are rear aspects appresented. 5. The co-givenness of rear aspects of physical things and the co-givenness of others' mental states are fundamentally different, since in the latter case the possibility of making originally given what only is co-given "must be excluded a priori." 6. The appresentations involved in empathy are motivated, i.e., justified. 7. "Not every non-originary making-present can" motivate, i.e., justify beliefs. 8. "A non-originary making-present can" justify beliefs "only in combination with an originary presentation," i.e., an originary presentive intuition.
Points 1, 3, 5, and 6 are of primary interest to us. Via empathy my beliefs about others' mental states can be justified even though others' mental states cannot, in principle, be originally given. By subscribing to these claims, Husserl clearly violates OTJ. Now, it is interesting to see how, according to Husserl, this is possible. His answer in 8 that this is only possible if originary presentive intuitions are involved is important but this is only the first step in resolving the puzzle. More details are needed to get at least a basic idea of the kind of dependency between originary presentive intuitions and appresentations that needs to be in place so that the former can motivate the latter. Some such details are provided in the following passage:
Let us look at the intentional situation more closely. The experienced animate organism of another continues to prove itself as actually an animate organism, solely in its changing but incessantly harmonious 'behavior'. Such harmonious behavior (as having a physical side that indicates something psychic appresentatively) must present itself fulfillingly in original experience, and do so throughout the continuous change in behavior from phase to phase. (Husserl 1960, 114) We may reformulate this as follows: What is only co-given can be motivated/justified by the corresponding originary presentive intuitions only if (i) expectations are involved which can be verified by new originary presentive intuitions and (ii) the verification of these expectations speaks in favor of what is co-given.
In the case of ordinary physical objects, this process is rather simple. If it is co-given that the table in front of you has four legs, there is the expectation involved that -if you go and check -you will see four legs. This expectation can be verified by an originary intuition, and the verification of this expectation confirms your motivated belief. In the case of other minds, the situation is a bit trickier. Say, by looking at your friend's face, it is co-given to you that the way you have replied to his question has made him angry. Your friend's anger cannot be given originally to you, but there are expectations involved that can. Such expectations might be that he will raise his voice, respond impolitely, or simply stand up and leave. These are expectations that can be verified by originary presentive intuitions and that you take to speak in favor of what is co-given to you, namely your friend's anger. Thus, in the case of others' mental states, it is others' behavior with respect to which you have expectations that can be fulfilled.
As I read Husserl, his claim is not that your belief that a person is in a specific mental state is justified only when this belief has been confirmed by the person's behavior, but is justified from the very beginning in virtue of being motivated by originary intuitions directed towards the person. Motivation is possible since there are expectations about their behavior that can be verified by future originary presentive intuitions directed towards the person's behavior.
Thus, let us replace OTJ with a new criterion of justification (CoJ):
Criterion of Justification (CoJ): Justification with respect to content C or object O is only possible if C/O can either be originally given or if C/O can be reasonably associated with expectations that can be verified by originary presentive intuitions.
Now, there are surely many more or less subtle differences between the unobservability of other minds and the unobservability of scientific entities such as atoms, electrons, and quarks. Clearly, however, not only other minds but scientific entities too can meet CoJ. The whole idea of cloud chambers or particle accelerators is to verify/falsify the expectations you have with respect to entities you cannot directly observe!
Further limits of originary givenness
In the previous section, the line of reasoning was as follows: For Husserl, other minds are in principle unobservable. Since Husserl holds that justification with respect to other minds is possible, he must reject OTJ. The way Husserl explains how justification with respect to other minds is possible shows that he subscribes to CoJ instead of OTJ. If CoJ is fulfilled, justification with respect to the entity in question is possible, even if this entity is in principle unobservable. Unobservable scientific entities such as atoms, electrons, and quarks meet CoJ. Thus, there is no systematic epistemological-phenomenological reason why we should not accept the existence of such scientific entities, which means that the basic epistemological principles phenomenologists need to subscribe to do not commit them to anti-realism.19
Before I provide further arguments for why CoJ is more plausible than OTJ, let me briefly discuss two natural objections to the foregoing argument. O1: One might object that we should not interpret Husserl as claiming that other minds can only be co-given (but not originally given). This objection is pressing since not all phenomenologists subscribe to the claim that other minds cannot be originally given20, nor do they agree on how to interpret Husserl. My argument, however, does not hinge on whether I have provided the more accurate interpretation. The point is that in the passages discussed in the previous section, Husserl offers CoJ as an alternative to OTJ. I argue that CoJ is more plausible than OTJ, which is why phenomenologists should subscribe to CoJ instead of OTJ. An opponent of my view must either show that OTJ is more plausible or phenomenologically more adequate than CoJ.
O2: I have argued that just as other minds can meet CoJ, so can unobservable scientific entities like atoms, electrons, and quarks. One might rightly point out that, phenomenologically, there is a fundamental difference.21 I know what it is like to have a mind, to be in a mental state, to have emotions, and to feel, for instance, sadness. While it might be true that other minds are unobservable, I do have originary presentive intuitions (namely introspective experiences) with respect to my own mind. However, there is no such analogy for unobservable scientific entities. I do not know what it is like to be a photon, to have zero rest mass, and so on. My response is that CoJ does not involve anything like a requirement for the kind of analogy that is in place with respect to other minds. It might be true that other minds fulfill CoJ because there is this analogy, but this does not imply that every object or state of affairs must fulfill CoJ by virtue of the very same reason. CoJ requires that unobservable objects must "be reasonably associated with expectations that can be verified by originary presentive intuitions." The fact that I know what it is like to have a mind and to have emotions might be the reason why I can reasonably associate other minds with certain expectations which can be verified by observing the behavior of other people. In the case of unobservable scientific entities this source of reasonableness might be something fundamentally 19 This, of course, does not imply that phenomenologists cannot be anti-realists. As Wiltsche has pointed out, there are passages in Husserl's oeuvre which suggest that he defines a real physical object as an object that can be the object of an originary intuition (cf. Wiltsche 2012, 110 different. It may involve inferences to the best explanation. Thus, to make objections like objection 2, one must dispute the validity of inferences to the best explanation or at least argue that they do not work in the specific case of scientific entities.
Let me now turn to further reasons why CoJ is more plausible than OTJ. Perhaps the most straightforward example is induction. Most researchers including Husserl (cf., e.g., Hua III/1, 171; Hua VII, 88, 102; Hua VIII, 240) agree that induction is a valid source of justification. Hence, if natural scientists base their reasoning on induction, then, at least in some cases, they are justified in believing what induction tells them. Induction can be used to justify general physical principles like "all masses attract each other." Such principles, however, are unobservable. What can be originally given to us, at best, are concrete cases such as an apple falling from a tree. What can never be originally given to us are such general principles. You cannot "see" a principle or a law of nature. Thus, if justification with respect to such general principles is possible, OTJ is false. Is CoJ again a plausible alternative to OTJ? It is. Allow me to illustrate this by means of a superficial and overused example. Assume, by induction you are justified in believing "all swans are white." This general statement cannot be originally given to you, but just as CoJ demands, there are certain expectations involved that can be. Such expectations, clearly, include that the next swan you see will be white. Of course, "all swans are white" is not a law of nature, but it is a proposition you are justified to believe although this matter of fact cannot be perceived but only be confirmed by seeing concrete cases that fulfill your expectations.
Hence, there are systematic reasons to reject OTJ and replace it with CoJ. Since CoJ allows for justifiably believing in the existence of unobservable scientific entities such as atoms, electrons, and quarks, it does not seem that there are epistemological-phenomenological reasons why phenomenologists should subscribe to anti-realism.
Finally, I would like to point out that OTJ would restrict our ontology more radically than we have seen so far. Witsche 2017 discusses three types of unobservable objects. Objects that cannot be observed due to their location in space (such as a rock on Venus), objects that cannot be observed due to their position in time (such as an event that has happened prior to all consciousness), and objects that cannot be observed due to their size (such as atoms, electrons, and quarks). Wiltsche rightly points out that the former two types of objects can fulfill OTJ, but the last one cannot.22
However, very small objects are not the only objects postulated by science that cannot fulfill OTJ. What about objects such as electromagnetic fields? It is reasonable to assume that there is a reason why your compass always points north. Science tells you the Earth's magnetic field is responsible for this. Does this field exist? Certainly, electromagnetic fields do not fulfill OTJ; you cannot see them. But this is not because they are too small. According to modern physics, fields are entities that permeate the whole universe and have a value at each point in spacetime.23 Besides fields, one might argue that spacetime as such is an object that exists but cannot fulfill OTJ. The same might be true for black holes. Note that all these objects could fulfill CoJ.
Conclusion
We have seen that Husserl's basic epistemological principles -the "principle of all principles" in Ideas I, the "first methodological principle" in the Cartesian Meditations, and the "most general principle of justification" in First Philosophy II -seem to suggest that phenomenologists are committed to the claim that we can gain justification only for what can be given to us originarily. This would directly lead to antirealism with respect to unobservable entities. In this paper, we have both put forward interpretational 22 Events that happened prior to all consciousness can be observed due to the finiteness of the speed of light. An event that happened 777 years ago can now be observed at a position in the universe that is 777 light years away from where the event took place (given that one possesses a sufficiently powerful telescope). 23 It is to be noted that most physicists and philosophers of physics would agree that fields are objects just like particles are. "Thus particles, fields, and spacetime points have all been identified, largely without argument, as paradigms of objects in physics." (McKenzie 2017, 3) It has even been argued that fields are the most fundamental objects of physical reality (cf. Hobson 2013 and Berghofer 2017b). and systematic reasons why such a criterion should be abandoned and replaced it with a new criterion of justification that satisfies the spirit of a Husserlian transcendental phenomenology while allowing for justifiably believing in the existence of unobservable scientific entities.24
